Dal fondo della sua galera Igor Girkin riesce a esternare su Telegram. Qualche giorno fa ha detto la sua sul presunto “piano di pace” russo in 28 punti. Il thread è utile per far capire a tutti quelli che “il fronte ucraino sta crollando” e “la Russia sta vincendo la guerra” che la situazione – sia al fronte sia politica – è tutt’altra checché ne dicano i vari Caracciolo e Travaglio.
1/ Igor ‘Strelkov’ Girkin warns from his jail cell that Ukraine and the EU have no reason to accept the Dmitriev-Witkoff proposals to end the war, because Russia is currently incapable of inflicting a strategic defeat on Ukraine, despite local tactical victories.
2/ The imprisoned Girkin has posted a lengthy analysis of the context of the 28-point plan (he says that he has not yet read the full content of the points, “which our media modestly remained silent about”).
3/ In a perspective which likely reflects that of powerful factions within the Russian security establishment (with which he has been closely linked), he sees the situation as overall negative for Russia, with the fiasco surrounding the plan hurting its own people’s morale:
4/ “[A]s I expected, the EU and so-called “Ukraine” have decisively rejected a “settlement” that would require any territorial (or other) concessions right out of the gate.
5/ “Simply because things are going well for them, and they have absolutely no reason to fear a collapse of the front and military defeat in the coming months—…
6/ …surely the fall of Kupiansk (one of the average district centers in the Kharkiv region) after a SIX-YEAR-LONG ASSASSINATION isn’t a “strategic defeat”?
7/ “Kyiv and the EU capitals understand perfectly well that neither Kupiansk, nor Pokrovsk, nor even Orikhiv, Huliaipole, and other towns and villages will bring the Russian Armed Forces a real victory unless the Ukrainian Armed Forces are routed in their capture.
8/ “And they HAVE NOT BEEN ROUTED. And they cannot be routed in a situation where the Russian Armed Forces only have the forces for tactical operations, but the forces for strategic operations are either completely absent or insufficient for their successful implementation.
9/ “(After all, our army currently does not even have the forces for an effective occupation of even left-bank Ukraine, even if, suddenly, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were to retreat across the Dnipro along its entire length!)
10/ “Therefore, the only real threat to the enemy is the moral breakdown of their own active army—when the mass of soldiers and commanders (the overwhelming majority) decide for themselves that “victory is impossible,…
11/ …defeat is inevitable, and there is no longer any point in sacrificing their lives for ‘all this.'” So far, apparently, this has not happened (and reports from the front confirm this).
12/ “Yes, it seems some units and formations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces have become less resilient in combat, the percentage of “ideologically motivated” soldiers has fallen, and the number of prisoners and those willing to surrender has increased.
13/ “But! Overall, the enemy continues to fight very stubbornly and in the most dangerous areas (Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia) – fighting for every hill, every house, every forest stand – as a result of which our tactical successes there are minimal or nonexistent.
14/ “This means that for some time, the Kyiv scum and their masters in Europe (and the US!) have nothing to worry about – they can continue preparing for the intervention in a relatively calm manner, preparing for war seriously and thoroughly.
15/ “What about us? Our military successes (albeit very limited) have “superimposed” on Trump’s points, once again providing some illusion of a quick deal (though there’s no sign of one, not just now, but in the medium term at all).
16/ “I can note that the expectation of a quick peace has even penetrated the ranks of the convicted (although it is viewed with scepticism by virtually everyone who is truly capable of thinking).
17/ “In this regard, the latest disappointment reduces society’s already low motivation to steadfastly endure the hardships and privations of the Special Military Operation.
18/ “And these depressive moods will only grow, and the remnants of trust in the government (already very insignificant) will quickly evaporate.
19/ “This, of course, will be contributed to not only by growing economic and (consequently) social problems, but also by escalating strikes (drones and missiles) from former “respected partners,” which our media stubbornly (and foolishly!) ignore in more than 90% of cases,…
20/ …providing abundant grounds for the same growing distrust of the government and the masses’ rejection of any official state propaganda. And this—in the context of a civil war (essentially)—is the most dangerous thing of all!
21/ “Even ordinary people, inexperienced in politics, already view the government with great scepticism, and tomorrow (as has already happened in the most tragic moments of our history), scepticism will give way to rejection, which enemies…
22/ …(not Putin’s!—the enemies of Russia and the Russian people!) will certainly try to exploit.
23/ “There is still time to change the situation.But for positive change to occur, “super-efforts” are already necessary, which are in no way contained within the hardened framework of a semi-war period and are completely impossible without radical personnel changes…
24/ …in the leadership of the Special Military Operation, industry, the ideological sphere, and (very important!) foreign policy initiatives.If nothing changes, we face a catastrophe. And one that our state (in its previous historical form) may not survive.”
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